Opinion: What Trump’s election means for South Korea

The New Zealand Track II delegation held roundtable talks with South Korea's Asan Institute for Policy Studies (pictured)

For small states like New Zealand the world has become a lot more stressful over the last decade.  The geopolitics of our region – and the world generally – are more volatile, with great powers on both sides behaving badly. 

The rules-based international order, which has underpinned the prosperity and security of states like New Zealand since the end of the Second World War, is eroding and is at risk of falling apart.

One of the first things we need to be doing as a country is talking to like-minded neighbours in the region about how we can all cope with this. This was the context for the visit to South Korea in November organised by the Asia New Zealand Foundation. 

The centerpiece of the visit was an all-day discussion with the Asan Research Institute, one of South Korea’s leading independent think-tanks. That was supplemented by a series of discussions with academics, journalists and other local experts on the ground on issues such as security, trade and climate change.

Arriving just days after the re-election of Donald Trump as the next US President, we found the mood in South Korea to be even darker than at home. 

South Koreans have good reason to be fearful about the state of the region – and of what Trump 2.0 might mean for them in both security and economic terms. 

For seventy years South Korea’s security has been guaranteed by the US military. Nearly 30,000 US troops are still on the group defending the South against its belligerent, autocratic and nuclear-armed neighbour.  

US Air Force airman at the U.S. Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea

For the last decade, Kim Jong Un has successfully built up his military, acquiring ICBMs and nuclear weapons, despite efforts (including by New Zealand) to enforce UN sanctions in response.  

Kim was shocked and embarrassed by the failure of summit diplomacy with President Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-In in 2018-19. 

Since then he has doubled down on his hostility to the west, and turned to Russia in particular. 

At the beginning of this year Kim announced that unification of the peninsula was no longer a goal of North Korea. South Korea, rather than an errant sibling, is now an “enemy”.  

He signed a mutual defence treaty with Russia – and then dispatched 10,000 troops to support Putin’s invasion of Ukraine (Kim seems to spin this as “defending” Russian territory against the Ukrainians).

South Koreans are split on how to respond to both the US and Russia. 

On the right, people worry that Trump’s America First approach will mean a weakening of the US commitment to defend South Korea, just as the threat from the North is growing.  

Calls for South Korea to go nuclear itself are growing. On the left, people fear that current President Yoon’s hostility to the North, close ties to the US, and involvement in the war with Ukraine may make open conflict more likely, not less.

Donald Trump and former Republic of South Korea President Moon Jae-in participate in a joint press conference in Seoul, 2019

Looming above all is the perennial challenge for South Korea of managing its long and complex relationship with the other superpower – China. 

South Korea has been loath to criticize aggressive Chinese behaviour in the region, but it has quietly built ties with like-minded regional partners including New Zealand. 

Both, for example, are members of the IP4 group of regional NATO observers (along with Japan and Australia). 

Like New Zealand, South Korea is not a member of the Quad or AUKUS – but is interested in both.  Like us, Yoon stresses Korea’s commitment to liberal democratic and global values.   Upholding those values in a world of increasingly open super-power conflict is highly challenging.

South Korea was subject to economic coercion from China from 2017 over stationing US missiles on its territory. 

The issue has been quietly managed, with only marginal damage to bilateral trade.  But now South Korea – massively trade-dependent on both China and the US - worries that it will be forced to further take sides.

During the Track II talks, Korea’s ship-building industry was cited as a point of leverage with Washington

Trade experts are assessing how South Korea can work with an increasingly transactional US – we heard several times about the potential for Korea’s ship-building industry to be a point of leverage with Washington. But Korea is also looking for ways to mitigate the risk of being squeezed between larger powers, including through diversification of its trade into the ASEAN countries.

South Korea has signed onto a number of regional trade initiatives, including the Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA) – an initiative of New Zealand, Singapore and Chile.

However, it has to date shown more interest in its trading relationship with the US than in seeking membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Agreement.  

One South Korean trade expert suggested during discussions that in light of the US election results, there would be merit in South Korea reconsidering the CPTPP.

"As a large manufacturing hub, Korea is understandably concerned about supply chain continuity." (High-tech manufacturing in South Korea)

As a large manufacturing hub, South Korea is understandably concerned about supply chain continuity.

South Korea has been a strong supporter of the supply chain aspect of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).

With Trump having referred to IPEF as ‘TPP 2.0’, and threatening to pull out of it, South Korea will be looking for ways to keep working with IPEF partners to sure up the regional supply chain architecture.

As a small and geographically distant nation, New Zealand has much to lose if the World Trade Organization (WTO) sinks deeper into dysfunction. South Korea also has a strong interest in a system governed by rules rather than political might.

It has not listed the WTO as a priority for its APEC year in 2026, but this speaks more to the government’s desire to “tone things down” as the spotlight is shone on it, rather than a lack of support for the multilateral system. As one interlocutor told us, “We have to be realistic”.

New Zealand Prime Minister Chirstopher Luxon talking at New Zealand-Korea Education Partnership Ceremony in Seoul

Realism ought not prevent South Korea and New Zealand from working together to shore up support for international rules and contain the potential fallout of the world’s largest economy turning inward. There are multiple ways of doing this, including through plurilaterals such as DEPA, and through the various activities of the WTO.

There are other opportunities too for New Zealand and South Korea to increase their cooperation.

Two areas that stood out during our visit as worthy of further attention are space – New Zealand and South Korea both have a burgeoning space sector – and climate change – renewables being a key area of interest to both countries.

Overall, the visit confirmed the value and indeed the urgency of New Zealand maintaining a strong dialogue with neighbours who share our values and our challenges.

About the authors

• Philip Turner - Former New Zealand Ambassador, Republic of Korea

• Tracey Epps - International lawyer and trade policy consultant

 The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative publishes expert insights and analysis on issues across Asia, as well as New Zealand’s evolving relationship with the region.