Chinese media report NZ 'entangled' in NATO's influence

Prime Minister Christopher Luxton meets with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the summit

In July, NATO leaders met in Washington D.C. for the political and military alliance’s 75th anniversary summit. New Zealand, alongside Australia, Japan and South Korea – non-member NATO partners sometimes collectively referred to as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) – also attended.

During the summit, and in the joint communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government, the organisation highlighted concerns about China’s behaviour, including its strategic partnership with Russia, adding to the summit’s newsworthiness in China.

The NATO War Machine

In their coverage of the summit, Chinese media outlets consistently presented NATO in negative terms.

The alliance was commonly held to be an anachronism that should have been dissolved – or “died a natural death” (寿终正寝)  – at the end of the Cold War.

On the Global Times (环球网), an editorial argued that despite pretences to the contrary, NATO is, at its “essence” (本质), a “war machine” (战争机器).

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian (林剑), in comments published on Xinhua Net (新华网), Beijing Daily (北京日报) and elsewhere, and reflecting a narrative found in many other articles, stated that “NATO’s so-called security comes at the cost of the security of non-NATO members” (北约所谓的安全以牺牲别国安全为代价). This was at times contrasted with China, which was depicted as a responsible actor in global affairs.

Chinese media depict New Zealand as being under the influence of NATO but having largely good relations with China

NATO was widely seen as seeking out crises and inventing threats to unify its members and justify its existence. As Xiang Haoyu (项昊宇), a research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, wrote in an opinion piece carried on Global Times,  Xinhua Net and other outlets, “NATO relies on continually fabricating new ‘enemies’ to sustain itself”  (北约靠着不断制造新“对手”而续命).

This practice, also described as constructing “imaginary enemies” (假想敌), was said to be evident in NATO’s efforts to build closer ties with the IP4 countries – and most immediately illustrated by the latter group’s presence at the summit.

By attending the summit, New Zealand and the other IP4 countries were viewed as being co-opted into serving the United States and its Indo-Pacific strategy; the goal of which was to “contain” (遏制) China – the new imaginary enemy.

The joint communiqué, reported to be “full of Cold War thinking and bellicose rhetoric” (充斥着冷战思维和好战言论) by Xinhua Net, was perceived as representative of these aspirations, with mention of the “China threat” (中国威胁) a cause of particular irritation.

NATO’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific was seen as not only ominous for China but also for the region as a whole.

This narrative was encapsulated in comments by Lin Jian on Global Times and elsewhere that “wherever the black hand of NATO extends, turmoil and chaos follow” (北约的黑手伸向哪里，动荡和混乱就出现在哪里). Lin and others emphasised the importance of the region’s issues being addressed by countries that are of the region.

Views on New Zealand’s Involvement

Despite widespread and stern opposition to ties between NATO and the IP4 countries, direct criticism of New Zealand was rare. This was primarily due to the perception that the United States was the driving force behind the IP4 countries’ presence at the summit and their broader engagement with NATO.

Rather, New Zealand was sometimes mentioned as a potential barrier to NATO expanding its influence in the Indo-Pacific, often because of its relative independence from the United States.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Christopher Luxton in talks at the NATO Summit

In his Xinhua Net opinion piece, Xiang Haoyu touched on New Zealand when exploring factors that may prevent NATO from realising its Indo-Pacific ambitions. He wrote, “although New Zealand is a member of the ‘Five Eyes’, it has never been particularly interested in getting involved in great power competition and therefore has always been viewed by the United States as a ‘weak link’ in its alliance to contain China” (新西兰虽是“五眼联盟”成员，却一向对掺和大国竞争和地缘政治兴趣不大，因而一向被美国视为遏华同盟链条中的“薄弱环节”).

Similarly, in Global Times, the “constant improvement” (不断改善) in China’s relationship with New Zealand (and Australia) was raised as possible problem for NATO.

While New Zealand was primarily grouped with the other IP4 countries and rarely singled out for attending the summit, comments made by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon in an interview with the Financial Times in Washington did bring New Zealand into the spotlight.

In the interview, Luxon, spoke, amongst other things, of New Zealand’s intention to publicise Chinese espionage, its openness to participate in the second pillar of AUKUS, the importance of working with NATO, and concerns about China’s behaviour in the South China Sea.

Luxon’s remarks, in both their substance and proximity to the summit, were seen as reflecting pressure on New Zealand to align its foreign policy with the United States and its allies and illustrative of the complicated nature of New Zealand-China relations.

An article on Tencent’s (腾讯网) news portal posited that Prime Minister Luxon may have “received some ‘inspiration’” (获得了一些“启发”) for his comments from the summit. It also noted a perceived tension between the comments and New Zealand’s desire to “make money” (赚钱) through trade with China.

Similar sentiment was expressed in a piece published on Net Ease (网易). This article also contrasted Luxon’s comments with his “relatively pragmatic approach to China” (较为务实的对华态度) during Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s (李强) visit to New Zealand a month earlier.  

In an interview with Global Times, Chen Hong (陈弘), director of the New Zealand Studies Centre at East China Normal University, also referenced the pressure that New Zealand was under.

He further observed that “at present, the New Zealand government has shown an inclination to move closer to the western camp, particularly on the AUKUS issue” (目前新西兰政府出现了向西方阵营靠拢的倾向，尤其是在‘奥库斯’问题上). Chen did add, however, that the relationship between China and New Zealand “is robust” (是稳健的).

It is important that we in New Zealand continue to examine how media in China report on New Zealand, and its relationship with China in particular.

At times, New Zealand-China relations are presented in similar ways in the mainstream media of both countries. Other times, the dominant media narratives in each country diverge to such an extent that people in New Zealand and China are presented with mutually incompatible versions of the relationship.

Greater knowledge of how New Zealand-China relations are depicted in China can aid mutual understanding and benefit this complex and important relationship.

This article was written by the Foundation's Adviser (Research and Engagement) Caleb Hoyle for Asia in Focus. The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative provides expert analysis on Asia and New Zealand-Asia relations.