Opinion: What would a Trump or Harris win mean for the Indo-Pacific?

David Capie: Whichever way the election goes, "most governments [in Asia] still want an engaged America that can contribute to a balanced region where no single power dominates."

The American presidential election on 5 November looks like it is going down to the wire. Polls put Vice President Kamala Harris and former president Donald Trump within the margin of error, both nationally, and in key battleground states. And as the votes are counted, governments across Asia and the Pacific will be watching as keenly as Americans themselves.  

A Harris win would be unprecedented in one sense. She will become the first woman president, a remarkable achievement given she was not even on the ballot four months ago. But when it comes to foreign policy, and foreign policy towards Asia in particular, a Harris administration seems likely to involve more continuity than change. Harris has not been particularly prominent in foreign policy discussions either during her time as vice president or in the Senate. Given Asia policy is widely regarded as one of the successes of the Biden administration, she is likely to stick with it.  

For the region, that means a continuation of strategic competition with China, which now seems baked in as a structural feature of global and regional politics for the foreseeable future. While some observers have speculated that senior appointments in a future Harris foreign policy team might lean towards Europe, it is hard to see how ties with Beijing will not be front of mind for any new administration.  

David Capie: "...a Harris administration seems likely to involve more continuity than change."

Continuity also means focusing on building ties with allies and partners. Under Biden, America’s “latticework” of overlapping alliances and security arrangements grew significantly. A key achievement was bringing together Japan and Korea through the Camp David agreement, something that will require ongoing attention from a new president. Biden also emphasised the importance of minilateral arrangements like the Quad as features of the regional security landscape, while continuing to support ‘ASEAN centrality’. Asian governments will continue to fret about a distracted America, and grumble when summits are skipped, but with few exceptions (most notably India), most will be happier with the prospect of a Harris administration. 

If Donald Trump wins a second term on 5 November, the picture is much less clear. Trump’s first term was notable for its focus on the Indo-Pacific and sharp confrontation with Beijing, especially on trade and tech competition. Much of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy was picked up and embraced by President Biden’s Asia team, albeit with more focus on working with allies and partners. What seemed like a radical approach to trade, tariffs and tech controls when Trump introduced it in 2017 has become American orthodoxy in 2024.  

President Donald J. Trump sits down with U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) at USPACOM headquarters in 2017

But if that points to some continuity, Trump’s highly personalised and transactional approach to foreign relations could as easily see him cut deals that undermine the interests of Asian partners. For example, in his first term, Trump sold arms and increased official interactions with Taiwan. But more recently he has criticised Taipei for “stealing” the US semi-conductor industry and expressed scepticism about defending it. Trump allies, including Elon Musk, have significant business interests in China, which might point to a softer line with Beijing. 

In economic policy, Trump has promised a radical hike in tariffs, as high as 60 percent against China, and 10 percent on all US imports. If enacted that would likely have a chilling effect on global trade and hit export-led economies across Asia. Countries, like Vietnam, that have grown their trade surpluses with the US as firms have relocated out of China, might find themselves in line for unwelcome attention.  The former president has declared the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) “worse than TPP” and vowed it will be “dead on day one” of his second term.  None of this will resolve a persistent criticism Washington hears from Asia: the lack of an American economic strategy for the region. 

David Capie: If Trump follows through on his more radical tariff threats, it would, " likely have a chilling effect on global trade and hit export-led economies across Asia."

If Trump’s first term is any guide, then defence spending is a key metric he has used to judge partners, especially in NATO. There will be pressure on Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia to do more, and spend more. That might lead to some difficult conversations for New Zealand, where defence expenditure has historically sat at around one percent of GDP, about half of what Trump might expect. The Luxon government’s upcoming Defence Capability Plan will be scrutinised closely, but more importantly, so too will be the level of funding actually committed to it.

Trump’s actions towards the rest of the world will also reverberate in Asia. If he weakens American commitments to NATO, cuts off military aid to Ukraine or forces Kyiv to settle for an unjust peace, leaders in Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang will take notice. Deeper support for Israel in its wars in the Middle East will further hurt America’s image in parts of Southeast Asia. Trump’s views on climate change and oil and gas exploration will undermine the United States’ interests in the Pacific Islands (even if US emissions actually dropped sharply during his first term, a period when the US also stepped up its attention to the South Pacific).  

Trump speaking to French President Emmanuel Macron during the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit

But for all the uncertainty and unpredictability, most regional states will still want to find a way to work with Washington. Even in Southeast Asia where states are reluctant to pick sides in US-China competition, most governments still want an engaged America that can contribute to a balanced region where no single power dominates.  

Polls suggest that New Zealanders overwhelmingly prefer Harris, with 55 percent saying they would vote for her in an August poll, compared to just 21 percent for Trump. But whoever wins, the Luxon government will want to find a way to work with Washington. The US relationship goes beyond any one individual, however powerful, and America will still be vitally important for New Zealand economic and security interests. Wellington will be privately hoping for a Harris win but preparing to deal with whoever the voters send to the White House.   

About the author 

Professor David Capie is Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations. His research interests focus on conflict and security issues, particularly in the Asia–Pacific, and New Zealand's foreign and defence policy. David has held visiting positions at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and at LUIS Guido Carli in Rome. He was regional co-chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) from 2020 until 2022 and was a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group from 2012 to 2019. 

The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative publishes expert insights and analysis on issues across Asia, as well as New Zealand’s evolving relationship with the region.