Opinion: Would Singapore prefer a Trump or Harris presidency?

Dylan M.H Loh: "...the Singaporean government is generally agnostic about who occupies the White House."

It may be trite to say that the United States’ presidential elections will have far-reaching global implications beyond its borders. Nevertheless, it is important to re-emphasise this point, as significant geopolitical issues — from the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to the evolving relationship with China — seem to be awaiting the next president before fully unfolding to their ultimate outcomes.

While Southeast Asia is generally untouched by hot conflict, it has seen an acceleration of great power politics playing out, and there is common consensus that the geopolitical atmosphere has darkened considerably.

President Trump celebrating his birthday at an official function in Singapore in 2018

Singapore, a strategic hub in Southeast Asia, is particularly sensitive to changes in Washington due to its significant economic and security ties with the US. What sorts of differences would a Harris or Trump presidency bring to bear in the region? 

In my opinion, the Singaporean government is generally agnostic about who occupies the White House.

We have had excellent relations with the Trump administration, as we do with the current Biden administration.

For instance, it was under Trump that Singapore renewed a defence agreement granting the United States military continued access to Singapore’s air and naval bases by extending access for an additional fifteen years, until 2035. It was then that the decision to acquire F-35 fighter jets from the US was also made.

Similarly, in the defence domain, but under Biden, Singapore and America signed a ‘Security of Supply Arrangement’ in 2023, where both countries agreed to fast-track essential and time-sensitive supplies for their respective defence needs.  

Across the two administrations, important agreements and progress were also made on critical technologies, clean energy, cybersecurity, and financial technologies, to name but a few.

In that way, bilateral relations are not expected to shift significantly from its historically strong and progressive character. That said, there is a greater perception of stability and predictability with a successor that does not deviate markedly from the Biden presidency.

With a second Trump presidency, it is anticipated that volatility levels will be higher — with possibly lower lows and higher highs.

We saw this with the somewhat sudden initiation of the ‘trade war’ with China in 2018 but also with the remarkable Trump-Kim summit in Singapore that same year.  

President Biden skipped the 2023 ASEAN summit after attending in 2021 and 2022

What would cause anxiety, then, would be a potential unravelling of global rules, norms and an eschewal of multilateralism.

A world that promotes unilateralism and protectionism would not be conducive to the prosperity and security for small states like Singapore and most of Southeast Asia.

In particular, the region will be closely watching what the new administration will do with regards to its current China policy.  

While there is consensus that Washington’s view of China as a long-term security threat will not change regardless of who becomes the President, there are clear tactical and stylistic differences that can be observed.

For example, the Biden administration has invested greater effort in setting an absolute floor in the U.S-China relationship while initiating the resumption of regular high level political dialogues together with military-to-military communications.

It remains to be seen how much of a premium President Trump and his advisors will place on continuing such efforts to normalise political and military communication.

Kamala Harris shaking hands with former President of Indonesia Joko Widodo at the 18th East Asia Summit in Jakarta in 2023

Some Southeast Asian elites also have a perennial but somewhat exaggerated fear of American abandonment in the region.

For some, Trump’s ‘no-show’ for three consecutive Associations of Southeast Asian meetings, after attending his first in 2017, was a reminder of American commitment (or lack thereof) to the region.

Admittedly, Biden also skipped an ASEAN summit hosted by Indonesia in 2023 after attending earlier the previous two years.

A stronger US presence that doubles down on the Indo-Pacific could reassure allies and partners, but risks agitating China, while ambivalence could embolden Beijing.

In short, how the new administration chooses to manage its strategic competition with China and whether it will continue to ‘show up’ will be hugely consequential to Southeast Asia. 

About the author: 
 
Dylan M.H Loh, PhD, is an Assistant Professor at the Public Policy & Global Affairs programme at Nanyang Technological University. His research interests include Chinese foreign policy, international diplomacy, and conceptions of international orders.

Dyan received his PhD from Cambridge University and his articles have appeared in China Quarterly, Cooperation & Conflict, International Studies Review, Global Studies Quarterly, The Pacific Review, International Affairs, and International Relations of Asia-Pacific among others.

Dylan is the author of China’s Rising Foreign Ministry (2024) published by Stanford University Press as part of the 'Studies in Asian Security' series. 

The Foundation's Asia in Focus initiative publishes expert insights and analysis on issues across Asia, as well as New Zealand’s evolving relationship with the region.